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NOTES AND COMMENTS
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near the scene and a piece of metal corresponding to that missing from
his car is found at the scene' this has been held sufficient to link
defendant to the vehicle as the driver.
Thus, the evidence of identification in the instant case seems at least
as strong as was present in those cases. For, in addition to identification of the automobile, the defendant admitted that he was the only
person driving his car on the night in question. If no one but the 'defendant drove the car on the night in question, then the conclusion is
inescapable that he was driving it when it was observed by the officers.
While it is true that defendant's admission was coupled with a denial
that he was at the place in question the State can offer such distinct and
7
severable parts of the statement as tend to establish its own position'
I
S
and the jury may believe the whole or any part thereof.
Thus, in
State v. King,'0 such an admission, coupled with a similar denial, was
held to be sufficient to identify the defendant as being the driver of the
automobile.
The evidence offered in the principal case seems to have been sufficient for the court to have affirmed the trial court in overruling the de20
fendant's motion of non suit.
HuRSHELL H. KEENER.
Executors and Administrators-Status of Back Pay
Owed Deceased Military Personnel
Title 10 of The United States Code, Section 868,1 provides in part:
"In the settlement of the accounts of deceased officers or enlisted persons of the Army, where no demand is presented by a
10

State v. Durham, 201 N. C. 724, 161 S. E. 398 (1931).

See Note, 99 A. L. R.

799 (1935).

Merely being seen near the scene is not sufficient to identify defendant as the
driver at the scene. State v. Ray, 229 N. C. 40, 47 S. E. 2d (1948) (defendant,
near scene of accident, driving truck which bore scratches and paint smears).
17 State v. Corpening, 157 N. C. 621, 73 S. E. 2d 214 (1911).
But the defendant is entitled to bring out those parts which tend to discharge him as well
as those which tend to charge him. State v. Watts, 224 N. C. 771, 32 S.E. 2d
348 18(1944).
STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENcE §181 (1946).
10219 N. C. 667, 14 S.E. 2d 803 (1941). Marks led from the scene of the
accident to the defendant's damaged automobile. The defendant's admission that
no one else had driven his car on the night in question was held sufficient to
identify defendant as the driver of the vehicle, even though neither defendant nor
his vehicle were seen at or near the accident.
"0The apparent conflict between the instant case and prior decisions on this
point could be reconciled by a statute creating a presumption that the owner of an
automobile is the driver. Such a presumption could be created by expanding N. C.
GEN. STAT. §20-71.1 (Supp. 1951), which creates such a presumption in certain
types of civil actions (see note 12 supra), to include violations of the motor
vehicle law. Such a statute undoubtedly has objectionable features (e.g., shifting
the burden of proof in a criminal action) which should be considered before any
changes are adopted. The legislature must weigh these objections against the need
for efficient law enforcement before determining the future policy of the State.
134 STAT. 1094 (1906), as amended, 10 U. S. C. §868 (1946).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

duly appointed legal representative of the estate, the accounting
officer may allow the amount found -due to the decedent's widow,
widower, or legal heirs in the following order of precedence:
First, to the widow or widower; Second, etc....
In a recent federal case, 2 the plaintiff, mother of a deceased soldier
to whom the Government owed arrears in pay, was the sole beneficiary
under his will and was named as executrix. She had notified the General Accounting Office that as soon as she could legally qualify, she
would claim the amount due the decedent; and requested that the
money not be paid to anyone until she had been appointed executrix;
particularly, she requested that no money be paid to the deceased's
estranged wife. Nevertheless, before the mother could legally qualify
as executrix, the money was paid to the widow. The plaintiff brought
this suit against the Government, and the question before the court was
whether the liability of the Government had been discharged under
Section 868.
The court held that the mother did not, and could not, under the
Iowa law occupy the status of a "duly appointed legal representative
of the estate" at the time the request was made and at the time payment
was made; therefore, she had no capacity to claim or receive the money
owed the decedent, and the Government was discharged of liability for
,the debt by payment to the widow.
Although Section 868 does not mention whether or not the money
paid under its provisions are a part of the estate, the court, in rejecting
the plaintiff's contention that the relation back of letters testamentary

or of administration should apply, said that the funds are not a part of
the estate except as Congress allowed them to become such; and that

the funds were allowed to be a part of the estate only if a duly appointed
representative claimed the funds before they had been paid out.8

If the full implication of this portion of the decision were carried out,
it would mean that unless the executor or administrator could legally
qualify and file claim before the funds were paid out, he would have no
claim against anyone for the amount allowed and could not secure these
funds for the purposes of administration.
The Ohio Court of Common Pleas,4 however, in a suit by an execu-

trix against a widow who had received pay under the same statute,
held that the pay due the decedent was contractual in its nature; that it
Keown v. United States, 191 F. 2d 438 (8th Cir. 1951).
* "But the difficulty in the present situation with this argument is that the funds
involved did not constitute a part of the decedent's estate for the purpose of administration, except as Congress had allowed them to become such, and Congress
did not allow them to become a part of the decedent's estate for the purposes of
administration from the fact of his death, but only from the fact that a duly appointed representative existed and had made demand before the money had been
otherwise paid out." Id. at 441-442.
' Scammon v. Scammon, 90 N. E. 2d 617 (Ohio C. P. 1950).
2
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constituted a part of the estate; and that the payment was received by
the wife in trust for the estate. The court stated that this section of
the code was not determinative of the right to take as between adverse
claimants; and compared it to the facility of payment clauses in insurance policies. 5 This decision seems to be in harmony with the Congressional intent and purpose. 6
A Tennessee decision 7 held that a similar debt was a contractual
obligation of the Government, not a gratuity; that it was a vested right
and thus was a part of the estate; and that the father of the 'decedent
could not maintain an action against the executor of the estate for the
funds received.
In both the Ohio case and the Tennessee case, the courts met the
issue squarely and decided that payments made under the provisions of
this statute were a part of the estate of the decedent, and as such correctly go to the executor or administrator. It has also been held that
retroactive pay raises, 8 debts due 'decedent by an employer, 9 debts due
from relatives,1 0 or due on account,": right to unpaid minimum compensation, 12 right to reimbursement under special acts,' 3 and generally,
all debts, rights, and choses in action, vest as assets in the administrator,
whose duty it is to collect them.14 Thus, it seems, in spite of the statement to the contrary in the principal case, that the money due the decedent could constitute an asset of the estate.
Even though the Government's liability has been discharged, if the
money received by the widow is a part of the estate, the executrix might
then attempt to recover from the widow; and, as was done in the Ohio
case, the court could apply the principle used in controversies arising
under the facility of payment clauses of insurance policies' 5 and allow
the executrix to recover from the widow.' 6
Since the object of the federal statute in question is to eliminate the
necessity of legal proceedings in settling accounts of deceased personnel,
'For the purpose of facility of payment clauses, see Rhode v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 233 Mo. App. 865, 111 S. W. 2d 1006 (1937) and Uptegrove v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 51, 15 N. W. 2d 220 (1944). See also cases gathered
in Note 166 A. L. R. 15 (1947).
'U.

S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE p.

1323 (1944).

Campbell v. Oliphant, 185 Tenn. 415, 206 S. W. 2d 406 (1947).
Joslyn v. Joslyn, 117 Mich. 442, 75 N. W. 930 (1898).
o Hawkins v. McCalla, 95 Ga. 192, 22 S. E. 141 (1894).
Penland v. Wells, 201 N. C. 173, 199 S. E. 423 (1931).
Mayo v. Dawson, 160 N. C. 76, 76 S. E. 241 (1912).
' Fletcher v. Grinnel Bros., 64 F. Supp. 778 (E. D. Mich. 1943).
Briggs v. Walker, 171 U. S. 466 (1898).
"Howe v. Mohl, 168 Kan. 445, 214 P. 2d 298 (1950) ; Sullivan v. Doyle, 67
A. 2d 246 (Md. 1949).
" Lutostanski v. Lutostanski, 120 Conn. 471, 181 AtI. 533 (1935); Smith v.
Massie, Inc., 93"Ind. App. 582, 179 N. E. 20 (1931). Contra, In re Pierug's
Estate, 196 Misc. 1062, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 66 (1950).
" See cases collected in Note, 75 A. L. R. 1435 (1931) for rights of adverse
claimants of proceeds of policies paid under facility of payment clause.
8
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and thus relieve their families from added expense and trouble, it seems
that some modification of this statute is to be desired. Such a modification should probably be in the nature of a prohibition against paying
such disputed claims before the legal representative can qualify and
claim the funds, particularly when the Government has notice of the
dispute.
BERNARD CR0WELL.

FELA Suits in Inconvenient State Courts-the Mayfield Case
The venue section of the Federal Eployers' Liability Act' gives a
plaintiff a wide choice in the selection of a forum, 2 but this privilege has
been abused 3 to the extent that a huge interstate commerce in actions
brought under the FELA has developed through the efforts of certain
law firms in several metropolitan centers. 4
Since 1910 5 the FELA has expressly provided that a suit may be
brought in a state court, or in a United States district court, (1) in the
district of the residence of the defendant, or (2) in the district where
the cause of action arose, or (3) in any district in which the defendant
shall be doing business at the time.0
Efforts by some railroads to avoid being sued in forums inconvenient
to them, by the use of injunctions, were unsuccessful. The United
States Supreme Court, in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner,7 held
that a state court could not restrain a resident from continuing the
prosecution of a suit under the FELA in a distant federal district court,
or interfere with the privileges of federal venue.8 The following year,

'35
235

STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§51-59 (1946).
STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946).

" The open door may admit those who seek not simply justice but perhaps
justice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff sometimes is under temptation
to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U. S. 501, 507 (1947).
'Winters, Interstate Commerce in. Damage Suits, 29 JouR. Am. JUD. Soc. 135
(1946). The chief centers are New York, Chicago, Baltimore, St. Louis, Minneapolis and Los Angeles. Many of these cases are brought from great distances,
some froni California to Chicago. See Winters supra at 137, and Note, 25 N. C.
L. REv. 379 (1947).
The original FELA, adopted in 1908, made no provision for venue. Following Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 82 Conn. 373, 73 Atl. 762 (1909),
holding that courts of Connecticut did not have jurisdiction to entertain an action
based on the FELA, Congress amended the Act in 1910 to provide that "the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states. . .

."

36 STAT. 291, as

amended, 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946). The United States Supreme Court later commented that "the amendment, as appears by its language, instead of granting jurisdiction to the state courts, presupposes that they already possessed it." Mondou
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 223 U. S. 1, 56 (1912).
' See note 2 mpra.
7314 U. S. 44 (1941).
8 The injunction could not be used "for the benefit of the carrier or the national
transportation system, on the ground of cost, inconvenience or harassment." Balti-

